Agrarian Societies Were Based Around

Agrarian Gild

Fire: A Socioecological and Historical Survey

Johan Goudsblom , in Encyclopedia of Energy, 2004

ii.3 Fire in Settled Agrarian Societies

In all agrarian societies with permanent settlements, new uses of burn down and new attitudes toward fire developed. During the long first stage of human fire use, the main business concern always was to keep the communal fire burning. From now on, still, the main business organisation became almost the opposite: to go along the fires that were lit for numerous purposes from spreading and from running out of command.

The uses of fire became increasingly more varied. Specialized pyrotechnic crafts emerged, such equally blacksmiths and potters. Amongst the growing urban populations, fire was regarded with greater feet, for several reasons: with the proliferation of fires, the risks of conflagrations increased, and with the accumulation of property, people had more to loose.

Of course, it was burn equally a natural force with its self-generating destructiveness that was feared. Simply more than and more, this natural force manifested itself about exclusively in the guise of anthropogenic burn down. With all the fires burning in a city, one moment of abandon might crusade a conflagration. People had to rely on other people'south circumspection. They had to oppress attempts at deliberate fire setting. And they had to reckon with the very worst danger: the organized grade of murder and arson known equally state of war.

A common trouble in all advanced agrarian societies was the prevention of uncontrolled burn down in cities. This problem may have been less urgent where the major construction textile was rock or brick; only throughout the agrarian era we observe major cities in which almost houses were built from timber. Rome, Constantinople, Moscow, London, and Delhi as well as the capitals of China, Korea and Nippon all suffered conflagrations; all of them faced problems of burn down prevention.

Today nosotros may tend to conceive of problems of burn prevention primarily in terms of engineering: of building materials and technical equipment. However, the problems were (and still are) at least as much civilizational, or social. The crucial effect was human behavior, intendance, consideration. According to a well-known story, a temple in aboriginal Greece burned down because the servant was careless; like events must have occurred all over the world. Everywhere it was the homo factor that counted about of all.

This was also reflected in the presence or absence of fire brigades. Today, it may seem self-axiomatic that a city should take a fire brigade. Yet, the ability relations in earlier societies could be such that the government would forbid the organization of fire brigades by citizens. A dramatic instance of a ban put on urban fire brigades is provided past two letters that were exchanged in the second century ce betwixt the governor of a province in the eastern part of the Roman empire, Pliny the Younger, and his emperor, Trajan. In the showtime letter of the alphabet, Pliny informed the emperor that the capital city Nicomedia was completely ruined by a burn; people had watched the bonfire passively, unable to practice anything. He therefore asked permission to institute a fire brigade of citizens in club to prevent such disasters in the time to come. The emperor denied the asking frankly, for—equally Pliny should accept known—such an system of citizens could easily turn into a club with subversive political activities.

It is nevertheless unknown to what caste Trajan's reply was typical of rulers in agrarian empires. The scattered evidence provided by local histories suggests that the situation was very different in the towns of medieval Europe, where the members of various guilds were required to take a share in fighting fires. This outcome is a promising subject for comparative historical inquiry.

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Migration and Evolution

Ronald Skeldon , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2d Edition), 2015

Migration equally an Integral Part of Development

At the simplest level, migration in a premodern agrestal social club was very different from that associated with a mod, highly urbanized society today; not that the former was static (it was not) and the latter highly mobile, but the means, speed, volume, and limerick of the flows of migration in the two societies are very different. Available technology determines how fast and oftentimes people move. Hence, if engineering science is how we measure development, the human relationship is fairly clear. In the yr 1774, some 265 ships carried 5027 migrants from English and Scottish ports to the Americas, an average of 19 emigrants per send ( Bailyn, 1987: p. 101). Virtually exactly a century later, in 1873, 17 companies were operating 173 steamships between Europe and New York (Nugent, 1992: pp. 31–32), many carrying more than than a 1000 passengers each. Over a century later on again, in 2007, there were some 425 000 flights beyond the Atlantic, and International Air Transport Association (IATA) forecasts are for three.half-dozen billion passengers worldwide in 2016, upwardly from the ii.8 billion in 2011 (IATA, 2012). Conspicuously, about people who fly today are not migrants setting out on a new life but short-term travellers on business concern or vacation. Nevertheless, these travellers are both producers and consumers of a global economy that can simply exist through our ability to move further, faster, more often, and more safely than always before. Evolution, in its broadest sense, has been associated with increased movements of people and the emergence of different forms of population motility, which complicate whatever simple approach to migration and development.

United Nations estimates placed the number of international migrants in the world at 232 million in 2013, around 3% of the population (Un, 2013). While the accented numbers of migrants had increased from 154 1000000 in 1990 and 175 million in 2000, the proportion of the world'due south population that was divers equally migrant under United Nations definitions had remained effectually the 3% mark. Ane can argue that the increased numbers of people migrating and moving are simply the consequence of an increase in global population numbers from 5.three billion in 1990 to 7 billion in 2012.

Although the number of migrants in the world is a function of the size of the population, the resultant numbers of movers are not a simple consequence of that expansion. Nevertheless, this introduces into the equation those aspects of evolution in agriculture, manufacture, public health, housing, medicine, and transport that have contributed to the pass up in mortality, the modernistic rise in population numbers, and the subsequent pass up in fertility. How all these variables, and more than, interact to generate migration and development outcomes creates a complexity that is captured in the idea of a 'nexus' equally in 'the migration-development nexus' in which all things are connected (Faist et al., 2011; Nyberg-Sørensen et al., 2002; Mossin Brønden, 2012; Phillips, 2011). Migration and development, all the same divers, are two processes that vary across space and through time, and it seems relevant to embark the give-and-take with approaches that attempt to conceptualize the complication from this point of view.

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Nationalism, Sociology of

Veljko Vujacic , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Ernst Gellner

Gellner (1983) starts with an ideal type of agrarian societies; their cardinal feature is an ideologically buttressed functional division of labor that separates the 'high culture' of a hereditary administrative-military ruling class and universal clerisy from the 'depression cultures' of socially isolated and illiterate peasant communities. This condition segregation has a cognitive dimension as well: the earth is experienced as culturally and ontologically heterogeneous.

A profound change occurs with the modern cognitive revolution. The world is now seen as a coherent whole subject to universal laws expressed in a unitary linguistic idiom. The social correlate of this cerebral revolution is industrialism. If intellectual progress presupposes the perpetual exploration of reality, the idea of unlimited growth demands the constant redrawing of traditional social boundaries and roles in line with the functional requirements of the partitioning of labor. These requirements can be met only past a common linguistic idiom transmitted through standardized education. Literacy in a shared language prepares individuals for new functional roles, increases their mobility prospects, and facilitates communication among strangers in an impersonal earth. The emergence of a shared culture favors nationalism as a political principle which holds that the state must balance on the foundation of national civilisation; the state, in plow, acquires a new source of legitimacy (cf. Weber). Thus, industrialism is a necessary status of nationalism. Ethnicity is secondary; information technology is nationalism that invents nations.

Finally, nationalism disseminates through uneven development. In a typical regal (e.yard., Habsburg) situation, an ethnic division of labor is present; the carriers of high civilization belong to one ethnic group (or groups), those of low culture to another (or others). The social exclusion of the aspiring intelligentsia of the subordinate group leads information technology to prefer ethnic nationalism as a strategy of collective mobility (e.g., Czech nationalism). In contrast, 'diaspora nationalism' develops amidst politically excluded high culture pariah groups (due east.m., Jews). The platonic case is a mature industrial society in which elites and masses share a standardized idiom and consider themselves to be conationals in a common state.

Gellner's elegant theory has enjoyed enormous influence. It tin can be criticized on several grounds: (i) the theory does not specify a causal (group) agent, nationalism is seen as a byproduct of the impersonal process of industrialization; (2) nationalism tin precede industrialization (east.thousand., Balkan nationalism); (iii) nations can precede nationalism; and (4) nations are rooted in premodern, ethnic identities (see Section Comparative–Historical Sociology).

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Consumption and Saving

Sylvia Lorek , Joachim H. Spangenberg , in Encyclopedia of Social Measurement, 2005

Classical Economics

For the 17th-century physiocrats, living in a predominantly agrarian social club, all wealth originated from nature (with land as a stand-in); the 18th-century Industrial Revolution inverse the perception of wealth and prompted a labor theory of value (with majuscule regarded as embodied labor), and saving and consumption became an issue of heated argue. Notwithstanding, to avoid misunderstanding, the definitions of terms must be kept in mind: in classic economics, saving was understood to mean "the conversion of revenues into capital" (the term refers not to the procedure, but the upshot). Saving as "nonconsumption," if used "productively," equaled investment. Productive apply of savings was entrepreneurial investment in productive, i.e., income-generating and capacity-enhancing, equipment and in technological improvements. Inspired by the labor theory of value, concrete reproduction (procreation), comeback of living conditions, and caring for offspring were considered productive as well. Consequently, they were not classified as consumption as they would be today, but as saving/investment, contributing a pocket-sized and mostly undiscussed share to the dominant accumulation and investment regime, which created savings mainly out of previously earned turn a profit.

The propensity to save has been explained in different, oftentimes complementary ways by dissimilar scholars. For instance, Adam Smith framed it as an institutionally and ideologically adamant habit; John Stuart Mill saw it as a combination of habit, a want to earn interest, and as investment or liquidity reserve. Because saving would be undertaken whenever possible, it was expected to exist a function of the level of income and its distribution, i.e., of money availability (a hypothesis that tin merits much empirical support, fifty-fifty in the mass-consumer society), and of investment opportunities. Of these two factors, promising investments were considered opportunities to drive the book of saving: a shortage of investment opportunities led to (enforced) saving, stalled progress, and an increase in relative prices (thus creating new investment opportunities and providing an indirect machinery leading to an equilibrium). Nearly two centuries subsequently Adam Smith, J. Schumpeter suggested a similar theory, focused on innovation instead of on investment in general. Schumpeter proposed investments financed by money from savings (money, in his agreement, that was withdrawn from other productive uses) or by credits, which would create a demand for savings to balance them.

The culling to the productive use of saving was not mass consumption, but unproductive "hoarding," withdrawing money income from electric current expenditures without diverting information technology to nonconsumptive purposes. Because the purpose of owning money was not defined to be making more money, but to purchase consumer goods, stockpiling money (e.g., to gain interest) instead of investing information technology in the national economy was considered improbable. The economist David Ricardo has warned that hoarding, leading to shortages of investment and demand, could be a permanent trouble in a growing economic system. In reality, the availability of opportunities to invest in real capital, the social taboo against squandering coin, and the halo of saving exit little room for involvement-based saving. Call back that given the prevailing income distribution of past centuries, simply nobles and business people had coin to salve. Consumption, i.eastward., the nonproductive use of savings, was perceived every bit typically happening in service industries catering to the demand for luxuries by the wealthy classes (as already mentioned, subsistence expenditures were not considered consumption). Expenditures on imported luxury appurtenances, jewelry, and artwork primarily did non aid the national economy, i.due east., were non productive, so consumption in this sense undermined development past impinging on the fiscal resources available for investment. Senghaas has empirically analyzed the atmospheric condition for economic development in a comparative report, and confirms that this phenomenon, if happening on a large scale, undermines the opportunities for economic success.

The tension between saving and consumption has been dealt with by different scholars in diverging ways. Economists such as Nassau W. Senior (1790–1864) focused on the conflict past promoting an "abstinence theory," supporting the supply of saving by sacrifice of consumption for capital aggregating and for adding value to property. John Stuart Mill modified this by redefining abstinence as waiting, i.e., the cede of forbearing to eat i'southward capital letter now, despite a time preference for firsthand use, for the benefit of deliberate investment. Involuntary saving, and so, happens in higher income brackets, if income exceeds the customary level of expenditure. Other economists, such as Smith, Ricardo, and Malthus, focused more than on the cyclical flow betwixt saving and consumption. The latter warned of overaccumulation resulting in underconsumption, stating that there was a pregnant adventure if the propensity to save dominates the propensity to eat, as "saving, pushed to backlog, would destroy the motive to production," which is consumption. In one case saving is encroaching on consumption, capital accumulates just risks secular stagnation. "Without exogenous spending past unproductive consumers the process of uppercase aggregating leads inevitably to secular stagnation." This constitutes a permanent risk of underconsumption, i.e., the amass demand of consumers is not sufficient to purchase all products at toll price, although the amass need consists of consumption plus investment.

Adam Smith denied such a hazard as a result of his perception of the economy as characterized past cyclical flows of money. His "saving-equals-consumption" theorem was based on a broader view of consumption, including household spending. It states that saving equals investment (i.e., nonconsumption) and results in salaries and income payments. These are in turn spent by consumption. Thus, saving creates constructive need as much as consumption expenditures do. Smith's theorem was formulated to undermine the diction that saving undermines consumption, assuming (1) that hoarding is a rare exemption, because money income (all!) is promptly spent, equally "it is not for its own sake that men desire money, just for the sake of what they tin can purchase with it" (Wealth of Nations) and (two) that investment/saving generates purchasing power as much every bit luxury consumption does, i.due east., the unproductive use of savings.

David Ricardo dealt with risks from saving past introducing the assumption that demands are clamorous: consumption would always rise with productivity growth. A sudden increase of saving would pb to growing capital, rising market wages, and, finally, rising consumption, and bringing consumption and saving into equilibrium once more. This is rather close to Say'due south (Jean-Baptiste Say, 1767–1832) theorem that every supply creates its own demand (through wages spent to swallow). The intention of economical actors is consumption, matching exactly the income they take gained, and entrepreneurship is considered a costless service.

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Service Industries, Electronic Commerce for

Choon Seong Leem , in Encyclopedia of Information Systems, 2003

I.B.iii. Information Contents Industries

Data grew into contents after experiencing the days in archaic society, agrestal society, and industrial society. Contents are simply non information in itself, but are the contents accompanied with media.

Owing to the popularity of the Internet, anyone can process such contents easily, and the demand on supply of contents has continued to abound chop-chop. Moreover, information contents industries, those industries processing contents appropriate to the customer, have developed.

Information contents industries are the ready of enterprises that process collected information from the media and industry contents and software of various kinds. These include film, television, radio, publication, etc. Recently, the on-line game industry, contents provider (CP) industry, and and so forth are undergoing rapid development over the Internet, and in these industries many kinds of business models appear through the medium of the Internet.

So, data contents industries are classified into ii categories according to the level of knowledge added and the object of application.

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Consumerism: Overview

L. Wong , J.F.P. Bridges , in International Encyclopedia of Public Health, 2008

Current Global Consumer Move

With an increasing global economy and economic development throughout the world transforming agrestal societies, consumer protection efforts are not isolated to a few countries. From avant-garde industrial to developing countries, consumer advancement organizations and government agencies in over 113 countries address national and international consumer issues through membership in Consumer International, a consumer advocacy organisation founded in 1960 (formerly the International Organisation of Consumers Unions). Another instance of global health-care policies shaped past the consumer movement is the European Patient Forum, a pan-European patient umbrella organisation of patient groups agile in advocating for patients' interests in public health and health policies debated by the European Commission. What are the forces backside this dual miracle of economic evolution and consumer protection? What do they predict for the health of the current and future global consumer?

To understand the forces that are shaping consumerism in wellness care, one model suggested by Ferrari (2004) identifies two necessary weather – adequacy of information and consumer empowerment. Increasing these could pb to a more than consumer-driven health-care system envisioned by Herzlinger (2004). Implicitly consumerism suggests a third status: consumer option, represented in Figure 1 . A free marketplace economy encouraged by consumerism would provide more information and a wider set of choices for consumers to make informed choices. Merely the potential for a consumer-driven health-care system may be undermined by the need for consumers to exist organized against corporate interests, lack of competition to provide choices, and express information on health-care financing mechanisms.

The central weather condition required for consumerism to motility beyond rhetoric tin exist summarized as a trilateral relationship amidst three factors: (1) adequacy of information, (2) consumer choice, and (three) consumer empowerment, in which high degrees of each status are needed for the health-care system to be sensitive to patients as consumers. The relevance of these three weather condition on electric current efforts in public health is evident ( Figure two ). Information, pick, and power are three necessary conditions for consumerism to flourish in public wellness. These weather condition mutually reinforce the part of consumers in their own health and health care. Information about health and treatment allows consumers to make informed choices for wellness-intendance purchases, which can drive the health-care market to offer drugs and health intendance that run across consumer preferences.

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Agrestal Political Economy

Henry Bernstein , in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (2nd Edition), 2015

Evolution and Underdevelopment (1950s–70s)

The newly contained countries of Asia and Africa emerged from colonialism still largely agrarian societies but now committed to 'national evolution', as were nearly Latin American countries which were generally more than industrialized. Modernizing agriculture was usually a central chemical element of ideas about 'national development', if oft subordinated to the want for industrialization, seen equally the master economic ground of prosperity, modernity, and sovereignty. Giving it priority could mean substituting domestic grain production with inexpensive wheat imports from the Usa (Friedmann, 1990), or 'postponing' agricultural modernization until the development of national manufacture could provide farmers with modern inputs, the dominant view in India for the commencement 20 years of independence before the 'Green Revolution' was launched.

During the peak menstruation of 'developmentalism' – the pursuit of state-led development – from the 1950s to 1970s, a wide range of policy measures was adopted and applied by governments in the South to 'modernize' their agriculture. Agricultural policy was also used to try to resolve some of the social tensions and contradictions inherited from their colonial histories, no less in Latin America than in Asia and Africa. Thus, for instance, country reforms, of very different kinds, were widespread in this period, as was authorities-imposed resettlement of rural populations (a familiar colonial exercise), for example, in parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. The 'integrated rural development programs' of the 1970s, a comprehensive 'packet' of education and health equally well every bit economic services to the countryside, was promoted specially strongly by the World Depository financial institution and USAID (the US Agency for International Development), which some interpreted equally their response to the success of a peasant-based and communist-led state of war of national liberation in Vietnam.

In this period, agricultural and more than broadly rural development policies exhibited a lot of institutional variety and frequent 'paradigm shifts' or, more simply, changing fashions, as they practise today. Despite their multifariousness, policies and programs of modernization shared a core logic: promoting a more productive agronomics based in deepening commodity relations, whether through 'smallholder' development or larger scale farming, public and private. This was often pursued past governments in the S in 'partnership' with the World Banking company, bilateral aid donors, notably the USA, Britain, and France, and private agribusiness capital (national and international), all of which supplied designs for modernization.

'More productive' addresses the technical weather condition of farming, through improved varieties and cultivation methods, and greater fertilizer use, together with 'soft' credit and technical advice to farmers (extension services). This was typically done on a crop basis, whether for export crops or nutrient crops, most famously the Green Revolution from the 1960s and its loftier yielding multifariousness (HYV) seeds of the 'big iii' grains of wheat, rice, and corn (or maize, the original 'Green Revolution' crop in the USA). The 'package' combined HYV seeds with fertilizers, requiring substantial irrigation to produce larger harvests.

'Deepening commodity relations' involves greater integration of farmers in markets, in which they specialize in producing particular commodities for sale, also every bit buying and using greater quantities of means of production ('modern' inputs) and means of consumption, which often include nutrient.

It is hard to generalize about the effects of agricultural modernization efforts during the moment of 'developmentalism', because of the variety of policy measures, of their technical and institutional 'packages' and of authorities capacities in delivering them; and the fifty-fifty greater variety of ecological conditions and types of farming to which they were applied. In fact, assessing the bear upon of policies – a sizable profession in itself – is ever challenging, because agricultural 'performance' is affected by many other factors likewise, from weather to the effects of macroeconomic policies (for example, and notably, apropos exchange rates of currencies and involvement rates), to the vagaries of markets and prices, locally and internationally.

Agrarian political economy engaged with, and contributed to, the assay of agrarian change and its policy debates in the moment of 'developmentalism'. This partly drew from research on precapitalist agrarian formations in the South, paths of agrarian transition in now-developed countries, and colonial experiences of agrarian change and policies to promote it, all of which could exist relevant to consideration whether capitalist agrarian transition was occurring and, if so, whether it was complete. Fence of agrarian change in the early decades of independence in Asia and Africa also highlighted a central tension between, on i side, those for whom modernization was a necessary component of agricultural growth, and its role in economic evolution more widely, requiring "peasant elimination" (Kitching, 2001) and, on the other side, "taking the office of peasants", in Williams' succinct expression (1976). This resonates a tradition of agrarian populism equally long as the histories of capitalist agriculture and industrialization (Kitching, 1982). Agrarian populism declares the virtues of peasant or family farmers and identifies with their struggles against those who threaten their reproduction and well-being, from merchants and banks, backer landed property, agrestal upper-case letter and agribusiness, to projects of state-led 'national development' centered on industrialization, in all their backer, nationalist, and socialist variants, of which the Soviet collectivization of agriculture in the 1930s was the well-nigh potent landmark. Its modern versions draw on the legacy of Chayanov, himself a victim of Stalin's purges, whose vision of a future 'peasant utopia' combined household farming with cooperation to achieve economies of scale (Bernstein, 2009, and references therein).

This historic, indeed near constitutive, tension in agrestal political economy is expressed in debates over, for example, the graphic symbol and effects of land reforms that claim to redistribute 'land to the tiller' (east.g., de Janvry, 1981; Byres, 2004); the political obstacles to taxation of capitalist farmers and rich peasants to generate an accumulation fund for industrialization ('rural bias' or at to the lowest degree class bias; e.yard., Mitra, 1977); and in opposition to the latter the statement of 'urban bias' as the main barrier to stronger growth by smallholder farmers, hence overcoming rural poverty (Lipton, 1977). In plough this was criticized every bit a (neo)populist 'myth' by Byres (1979). These kinds of questions, and bellboy disagreements, carried over, and have intensified if anything, as the moment of state-led 'developmentalism' gave mode to the 'neoliberalism' of marketplace-driven doctrines and practices of development in the context of globalization since the 1970s (see beneath).

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Market Assay

Edward A. Glickman , in An Introduction to Real Estate Finance, 2014

2.3.1.5.2 Births and Migration versus Decease and Emigration

Steady population growth increases need for goods and services and leads to economic growth. Agrarian societies crave offspring to continue food production and back up elders when they are no longer able to work. Countries with poor health care and high infant bloodshed require higher birth rates to ensure the survival of enough offspring to maintain food production. If countries with high population growth improve infant bloodshed, they tin can grow rapidly. In sure circumstances, this growth can create dire poverty; in other cases, rapid economic growth. The latter case has recently occurred in many formerly developing nations such as China, India, Brazil, and Malaysia.

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The Story of Service Science

Yvonne de Grandbois , in Service Science and the Data Professional person, 2016

Agricultural, Industrial, and Post-Industrial Economies

The agricultural revolution began the globe economy as we know it today. In an agrarian order the majority of the population lives and works on the land and produces its own food. The period between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw food product expand because of advances in tools and machinery as well equally farming practices, similar crop rotation for case. Efficiency improved, and surpluses in food product could exist sold for turn a profit. Wealth was based on country ownership and what the land produced. During the agronomical phase, towns and cities grew, and regions began to deal in commerce and trade.

The industrial phase refers to the widespread creation of new industries, and more than generally to the radical transformation of the economy from farming to manufacturing. The almost famous industrial revolution occurred in Britain during the mid-eighteenth century and spread to the rest of Europe and the United States within a few decades. Russia, People's republic of china, and Bharat experienced theirs later, by the late twentieth century. The industrial society is one in which wealth is produced by turning raw materials into products that are sold in the marketplace. Wealth is based on capital.

The post-industrial, or the data or noesis economic system brings us to the present time. Whereas the agronomical and industrial phases were based on the production of appurtenances, the mail service-industrial is rooted in information and services. We have a shift here from physical products to knowledge, ideas, and literacy, and the work force is an educated ane.

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Structural Dimensions

Peter B. Mayer , in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Third Edition), 2022

Deeper Causes: Economic Transition From Traditional, Agrarian Societies to Industrialized Societies

Information technology has long been axiomatic from the experiences of Europe and North America that the transition from an agrestal society to an industrialized one is greatly upsetting for a state. Not only are there large-scale physical movements of populations out of once-stable rural communities to burgeoning urban areas, but there are profound psychological and social adjustments that are imposed. This menses of transition is i in which social order is placed under the greatest strain. In developing countries, the strains are fifty-fifty greater considering pop political participation is better established than information technology was in 19th-century Europe, merely there is besides the visible example of living standards in already industrialized societies. These weather have led theorists to propose the existence of a "revolution of rise expectations." One influential assay of why the military play such a pregnant role in developing societies is that offered by Samuel P. Huntington. Huntington, similar many analysts, emphasized the socially disruptive nature of modernization ( Huntington 1968). Nation states, political parties, and modern communications all act to undermine older forms of village and local authority. The fracturing of older institutions and loyalties unavoidably leads to increased disharmonize and violence in society. In effect, Huntington suggested, betwixt the relative stabilities of traditional societies on the i paw and mature modernized societies on the other, there is a dangerous domain of modernizing transition that is characterized past political disorder and coup. There are two master paths that traverse the zone of transition. There is a path of "civic politics" where political institutions are relatively well developed. The alternative path, where institutionalism is weak, is that of "praetorianism." Military intervention in politics is particularly common in praetorian societies. The political position of the military changes as society modernizes: "In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the center-grade world he is a participant and arbiter; every bit the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing club" (Huntington, 1968, p. 221). In an earlier study, Huntington argued that as societies get industrialized, their militaries will become increasingly professionalized and will consequently blot and support the liberal democratic view that the military should serve and not dominate society (Huntington, 1957). Though this view is widely cited, it is not clear that it helps explicate a great deal about the behavior of military groups in developing countries. In Latin America in the 1970s, for instance, highly professional person armies in Argentina and Chile overthrew democratically elected governments. In S Asia, the army created in British Bharat was divided betwixt Republic of india and Pakistan; while the Pakistani military machine over the past 50 years has overthrown several elected governments and retains a preponderant position in national politics, the Indian military has remained strictly subordinate to noncombatant authority.

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